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Attorneys for Appellant
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
AMEY J. NELSON,
Docket Number: 46027
Case No.: CV-2016-1618

Appellant,
vs.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC.
and DOES 1 through 10 inclusively,
Respondents.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF THE SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY
COMES NOW, Appellant, Amey J. Nelson, by and through her counsel of record, Allen
H. Browning, ISB #3007, and appeals the Order of Summary Judgment of the District Court
entered March 6, 2018.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction lies in this Court for appeal from the decision of a district judge pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 11.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On one occasion Plaintiff was using the Anytime Fitness facilities by herself and saw
a notice on a whiteboard posted by the office at that location, which advertised a
"circuit class" at Anytime Fitness and that a trainer would be teaching the class. (R.,
p. Aug 1, L. 4-6).
2. The circuit class was put on by Anytime Fitness and it was clear that an instructor
would be selected by Anytime Fitness. (R., p. Aug 12 L. 1-4).
3. Plaintiff did not arrange for Stefani Kaufman to instruct the class. (R., p. Aug 2, L. 7-

9).
4. The Principal here, Anytime Fitness, has stated that Defendant was never an agent or
employee of Anytime Fitness or AT Fitness, LLC. (R., p. 63-64, L. 4, 1-3).
5. The principal here, Anytime Fitness has stated in an affidavit that Defendant was an
independent contractor to Anytime Fitness. (R., p. 64, L. 6-7).
6. The principal here, Anytime Fitness has stated in an affidavit that Defendant was paid
as an independent contractor, for one task, by Anytime Fitness. (R., p. 64, L. 6-7).
7. Plaintiff attended the class at the date and time noted on the whiteboard. (R., p. Aug
2, L. 10-11).
8. Plaintiff was the only attendee of the class. (R., p. Aug 2, L. 17).
9. Defendant was the only other person present for the class. (R., p. Aug 2, L. 21).
10. Plaintiff followed Defendant's instructions exactly as she was told. (R., p. Aug 2, L.
22).
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11. Defendant directed Plaintiff to the machine. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 7-9) ..
12. Defendant directed Plaintiff as to how to hold the handles of the machine. (R., p. Aug
3, L. 2-3).
13. Defendant, having observed that Plaintiff was not able to use the machine properly,
changed the configuration of the handles on the machine. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 4-5).
14. Defendant instructed Plaintiff to push down on the machine with the end of the
handle in the palm of her hand instead of pushing down with the wide part of the
handle. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 4-5).
15. Defendant was in front of Plaintiff directing her movements the entire time she was
on the machine. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 6-7).
16. The handles of the machine rotated when pushed, they were not fixed in place. (R., p.
Aug 3, L. 8).
17. Defendant instructed Plaintiff how to hold the handles on the machine she was
instructed to use. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 9-10).
18. Defendant improperly instructed Plaintiff how to hold the handles on the machine.
(R., p. Aug 9, L. 8, p. Aug 9, L. 1-6.)
19. Defendant instructed Plaintiff to push down on the handles, causing her left hand to
move sideways, flipping the machine handle over and subsequently striking her left
hand. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 11-14).
20. The strike caused a fracture in the metatarsal bone of Plaintiff's left hand. (R., p. Aug
3, L. 11-14).

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

5

INTRODUCTIO N AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal stems from a Personal Injury Case filed in the Seventh Judicial District of
Idaho, County of Bonneville. Plaintiff, Amey J. Nelson, alleged that she sustained a fracture to
her 5th metacarpal bone while following the instruction of Defendant, Stefani Kaufman.
Plaintiff initially sued both Stefani Kaufman an Anytime Fitness. Anytime Fitness
defended on the basis of an agreement it had with Amey J. Nelson and submitted an affidavit that
it was not liable for the actions of Stefani Kaufman because she was not an agent and that she
was an independent contractor. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Anytime Fitness. This Appeal is not from that judgment.
Defendant Stefani Kaufman then moved for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted erroneously as a matter oflaw.
Plaintiff filed this Appeal in response to the erroneous judgment by the District Court.

ARGUMENT
1.

The Court Erred in finding that Defendant was not an Independent Contractor.
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Defendants have stated that Plaintiffs have failed to appeal all grounds of the District
Courts judgment; however, Plaintiff has appealed the entire judgment of the District Court. The
core of Plaintiffs appeal on this issue stems from the lack of any form of agency, whether actual
or apparent of Stefani Kaufman as to Any Time Fitness. Amey Nelson has appealed the District
Court's judgment on the basis that there is no factual basis or evidence of any type of agency
authority as to Stefani Kaufman. There is no evidence of express authority in this case. To the
extent that the District Court found express authority in this case, there is no evidence of it and
Amey Nelson has appealed the complete order of the Court. There is no evidence that Stefani
Kaufman was an agent in any form.
The Court had an affidavit from the owner of Any Time Fitness stating that Stefani
Kaufman was not an agent of Any Time Fitness. There cannot be a summary judgment as to
such agency when the record shows that the principal denied any such agency. Further, Stefani
Kaufman never provide any agreement between herself and Any Time Fitness showing any such
agency. Summary Judgment would be improper under those facts.

2. Apparent Authority
Defendants misstate Plaintiffs argument by asserting that "The District Court did
not commit error in finding that Kaufman was not an independent contractor because it made no
such finding." Respondents' Brief, Pg. 16, L. I 0-11. The District Courts error is that it did not
make that finding, contrary to undisputed evidence before the Court. The undisputed evidence
before the Court showed that Kaufman was an independent contractor and no evidence was put
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forth to show that she was an agent of Any Time Fitness, through either apparent or actual
authority.
Defendants have once again misread the law applied in Forbush, for which Defendants
cite to Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728.
"This Court has previously viewed the question of whether an agency relationship
exists as a question of fact for the jury to determine." Id. at 735 n.2, 366 P.3d at
1095 n.2. But, to be clear, "[w]hether facts sufficient to constitute an agency
relationship exists is indeed a question of fact for the jury, however, whether a
given set of facts are sufficient to constitute an agency relationship is a question of
law appropriate for this Court's consideration."

Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 162 Idaho 317,330,396 P.3d 1199,
2033-2034 (Idaho 2017) citing Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728,735,366 P.3d 1088, 1095
(2016)(emphasis added).
In other words, a court can determine first whether there are enough facts present to even
allow a question of agency to proceed in litigation. If there are insufficient facts, the case cannot
proceed to a jury trial, and there is no agency. If, however, there are facts showing agency, the
case may proceed to a trial, where a jury may determine whether there was in fact an agency.
Defendants have asserted that "The District Court correctly ruled, under the second prong [sic]
that the undisputed facts constituted an apparent agency relationship, which is a question of law."
Respondents' Brief Pg. 18, L. 18-19. In Forbush, the Court clearly outlined a two-prong test.

3. Amey Nelson's statements and impressions have no bearing on an agency
relationship between Any Time Fitness and Stefani Kaufman.
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Defendants incorrectly assert that the statements of Amey Nelson should be taken into
consideration when determining an agency relationship. Respondents' Brief, Pg. 19, L. 4-10. As
clearly stated in Plaintiff's initial brief, Amey Nelson's impressions as to Stefani Kaufman's
status are entirely irrelevant under the case law and have no bearing on any determination of
agency. Apparent authority of an agent is determined by acts of the principal, not acts of
the agent. It is conduct of the principal and not of agent that binds the principal. Declarations of
an agent are insufficient to prove the grant of power exercised by him and bind his principal to
their parties. Chamberlain v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 42 Idaho 604, 24 7 P. 12.

4. The District Court's use of apparent authority as a shield from liability.
The doctrine of apparent authority was designed to protect a party such as Amey Nelson
when she is misled to her detriment by a principal. It was never designed to shield an
independent contractor from the consequences of that contractor's tortious acts. The District
Court erred by applying apparent authority as a shield from liability for Stefani Kaufman. While
the extension of the Membership agreement to agents shields agents from liability, the District
Court extended an agency relationship to Stefani Kaufman, thereby allowing her to fall under the
protections in the Membership agreement. Apparent authority is meant to be used as way to
make a principal liable for the actions of the agent, it is not meant to be applied in the manner the
District Court did, so as to allow the alleged agent to claim protections not available to her.

5. District Court erred in construing facts in favor of the moving party.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

9

Defendants presented no facts to dispute Plaintiffs facts at Summary Judgment.
Plaintiffs facts, demonstrating that Stefani Kaufman was an independent contractor and
demonstrating that she was not an agent in any capacity of Any Time Fitness, were disregarded
by the District Court and all determinations were made in a light most favorable to the moving
party. In doing so, the District Court erred in construing the facts in the light most favorable to
the moving party.
Because of these errors by the District Court, this case must be reversed and remanded to
the District Court for trial, with no consideration given to apparent authority.

DATED this 12th day of February, 2019.

BROWNf!!Q
Allen H. Browning

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of February, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney of record by email, efile, or facsimile.
Jeffrey A Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
ELAM & BURKE, PA
251 East Front Street Ste. 300
PO BOX 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701

US MAIL
_FAX (208)384-5844
HAND DELIVERY
COURTHOUSE BOX
~ EMAIL/EFILE (jat@elamburke.com;
jfs@elamburke.com)

th

DATED this 12 day of February 2019.~
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Legal Assistant
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